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I. Introduction
I’m honored to have the opportunity to reflect on my over
thirty years at Washington and Lee and to explain and evaluate
the scholarly work that Professor Lyman Johnson and I have done
here. In this Essay, I will focus on three topics. First, I will offer a
few words about the beginnings of our collaborative work. We
embarked on our scholarly careers in the later 1980s, a time of
great turmoil in the corporate law arena brought about by the
hostile takeover phenomenon and its social costs. Although we
came to this problem from quite different political perspectives, we
* J.B. Stombock Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University. I am
grateful to the organizers of this Symposium for all the work that went into
making it such a success. Thanks also to my friends and colleagues Christopher
Bruner and Lyman Johnson for their thoughts on an earlier version of this Essay
and to the Frances Lewis Law Center for its financial support.
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shared a determination to challenge the then-orthodox view that
the primary objective of corporate law was and should be
shareholder wealth maximization. We termed this the
“shareholder primacy” conception of corporate purpose.1 In Part III
of this Essay, I will address in detail what I take to be the status
of shareholder primacy today.2 I will close with some thoughts
about the impact that we may have had both within and beyond
the academy.
II. Shareholder Primacy and Hostile Takeovers
I arrived at Washington and Lee in 1986. This was my first
teaching job after three years at a large Boston law firm, where I
had been an associate in the litigation department. I spent most of
my time there on large corporate and commercial cases, doing my
part at the bottom of the staffing hierarchies. This mostly meant
discovery, and most of that was utterly tedious document
production. There were also research memorandums and some
brief-writing, and occasional second-chairs at depositions, but I
never did participate in an actual trial because the big cases almost
never went to trial.
Because of my experience at the law firm, limited though it
was, I thought I would be best suited to teaching civil procedure
and evidence. My scholarly interests were elsewhere. I had a Ph.D.
in medieval English legal history and expected to continue to work
in that area, but I was also drawn to legal issues of more
contemporary importance.
I was particularly interested in antitrust law because of the
important political questions it addressed. In those days, debates
still raged over the basic goals of the antitrust laws. There was a
strong tradition that saw the law’s principal goal as controlling the
economic and political power of gigantic corporations.3 Against this
1. See David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 223 n.2
(1991) [hereinafter Millon, Redefining Corporate Law] (coining the term
“shareholder primacy”).
2. Infra Part III.
3. See, e.g., Jesse W. Markham, Jr., Lessons from Competition Law From
the Economic Crisis: The Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the
“Too-Big-To-Fail” Phenomenon, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 261, 266 (2011)
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older notion were new ideas promoted mainly at the University of
Chicago.4 According to this view, the antitrust laws should not be
concerned with big business as such.5 Monopoly could be efficient
and therefore beneficial to consumers.6 Loss of less-efficient
smaller businesses therefore was not a bad thing, even though that
meant loss of economic opportunity for their owners.7 For me, this
debate raised important political questions about economic power
and social justice in the context of the structure of our nation’s
economy. As a result, my first major article, published in 1988,8
was about the history of the Sherman Act,9 the principal antitrust
statute. I argued that the statute reflected nineteenth-century
ideas that valued decentralized, balanced economic power and
were hostile to concentrated power regardless of potential
efficiency benefits.10
In addition to the course on antitrust law, I ended up being
assigned to the business organizations course instead of civil
procedure or evidence. It did not occur to me that I would end up
writing about corporate law because I didn’t think it would be of
interest to me. The big questions then revolved around the balance
of power between shareholders and management and how that
balance might be adjusted to achieve better financial returns for
investors. Larger issues of social or economic justice were generally
ignored. Professor Victor Brudney, my law school corporate law
(“[A]ntitrust law in an earlier era was concerned about the threat of harm outsized enterprise posed to others by its sheer power . . . .”).
4. See Millon, infra note 8, at 1221 (discussing antitrust law as emphasizing
“the maximization of aggregate consumer welfare, defined as optimal satisfaction
of consumer preferences” (citing Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979))).
5. See id. (“The second element [of the Chicago School] emphasizes that
maximization can only occur if antitrust law is interpreted and applied without
regard for other values that conflict with the efficiency norm.”).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. David Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1219 (1988). This article had its origins in a paper I wrote as a third-year
law student under the direction of Professor Morton Horwitz.
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
10. My article was in part a refutation of then-Professor Robert Bork’s claim
that the Sherman Act’s legislative history reflected the Chicago School’s efficiency
agenda. Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L.
& ECON. 7 (1966).
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professor, acknowledged as much when I ran into him at a
conference shortly after I entered law teaching. I expressed to him
my misgivings about corporate law as an academic field. He
responded, “Yes, the struggle between the common and the
preferred shareholders is not the class struggle.” For those
interested in political economy and social justice, academic
corporate law in the early 1980s evidently was not the place to be.11
But all that was changing when I arrived at Washington and
Lee. The hostile takeover boom was in full swing.12 For me, this
ended up meaning that corporate law could be far more interesting
than I had thought coming out of law school.
Hostile takeovers fractured long-standing assumptions about
managerial autonomy and shareholder passivity in a two-party
corporate governance universe.13 Corporations and specialized
buy-out groups were using borrowed capital to buy controlling
blocks of stock in companies whose shares were undervalued.14 The
tender offer device allowed those seeking control to appeal directly
to the target company’s shareholders by offering them a large
premium over the market price of their shares.15 Raiders able to
acquire a controlling block of shares could then put in a new
management team dedicated to trimming waste and managerial
slack, divesting the corporation of underperforming divisions and
subsidiaries, and cutting expenses even where they might promise
long-term gains.16 If successful in these efforts, the new owner of
the target corporation’s stock would realize a potentially large
increase in the value of its shareholding.
What was compelling about all this to Professor Johnson and
me was the fact that hostile takeovers presented a stark tradeoff
between the interests of shareholders on the one hand and those of
11. To be sure, there were plenty critics of corporate power, but they
generally were not corporate law academics. See generally, e.g., RALPH NADER ET
AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION: HOW THE LARGEST CORPORATIONS CONTROL
OUR LIVES (1977).
12. Dale Arthur Oesterle, Method to the Merger Madness: Revisiting the ‘80s
Takeover Boom, REGULATION, Spring 1997, at 27.
13. See Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS.
LAW. 101, 102 (1979) (discussing whether directors must accept any takeover bid
“that represents a substantial premium over the current market [price]”).
14. Id. at 104.
15. Id.
16. Oesterle, supra note 12, at 27.
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nonshareholders—especially workers—on the other. For
shareholders, a tender offer presenting a big premium over market
price meant quick and easy profit.17 And shareholders stood to gain
even if their company was not the target of a hostile tender offer
because all managers had an incentive to boost share prices in
order to deter raiders looking to profit from acquisition of
underperforming companies.18
But these gains for shareholders often came at the expense of
nonshareholders.19 Post-takeover corporate management cut costs
wherever possible because it had to pay down the enormous debt
assumed to finance the acquisition.20 This could mean plant
closings and lay-offs, and elimination of discretionary expenditures
like research and development or marketing. It could also mean an
end to investments in nonshareholder wellbeing such as job
training or health and safety programs justified by the
corporation’s long-term sustainability.
Lawyers quickly developed legal tactics that allowed corporate
management to resist unwelcome tender offers.21 Most notable, of
course, was the poison pill.22 These and other antitakeover devices
had the effect of blocking acquisition efforts not sanctioned in
advance by target company management. Predictably, target
company shareholders and hostile bidders challenged these
antitakeover defenses in state courts, most importantly
17. See Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 1, at 224 n.3
(“Premiums paid to shareholders in hostile tender offers have averaged 50% over
market price.”).
18. See id. at 234 (“The looming threat of a hostile takeover spurs corporate
managers to eliminate slack and otherwise increase corporate profitability . . . .”).
19. See id. at 225 (arguing that “relentless pursuit of profit maximization for
[shareholders’] sake can impose substantial costs on nonshareholders”).
20. See id. at 234 (“The use of enormous amounts of credit to finance these
acquisitions creates strong pressures to cut costs, and, in some cases, prompts
asset liquidations and plant closings.” (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders
Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2–7
(1986))).
21. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161,
1165–82 (1981) [hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s
Management].
22. See Suzanne S. Dawson, Robert J. Pence & David S. Stone, Poison Pill
Defensive Measures, 42 BUS. LAW. 423, 424 (1987) (describing the use and
different methods of poison pill tactics . . . .”).
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Delaware’s.23 The stakes now being so high, judges found
themselves compelled to revisit older rulings that had accorded
broad (though not unlimited) business judgment rule deference to
target company management seeking to resist a hostile takeover.24
Now, they were required to side either with target company
management and nonshareholders by allowing defensive
measures or, instead, with target company shareholders and
hostile bidders by striking down defensive measures and
mandating that target company management remain neutral and
allow shareholders to decide for themselves whether to accept a
tender offer.
Advocates for shareholders saw the problem in terms of
shareholder property rights and freedom of contract. Stock was the
shareholders’ property and they ought to be able to decide when to
sell or not. The Delaware courts—wisely, in our view—chose a
different perspective, characterizing the problem as a question of
“where the power of corporate governance lies.”25 Allowing target
company shareholders freedom to decide whether to accept a
tender offer would in effect give them the power to decide the
corporation’s future, because a successful tender offer would result
in new management and potentially big changes necessary to
make the acquisition profitable to the raider.26 Viewing the
problem in terms of corporate governance, it was not surprising
that the Delaware Supreme Court came down on the side of
management’s power to block hostile takeovers in order to preserve
its authority to determine the corporation’s future.27 This
conclusion was entirely consistent with the foundational principle
of Delaware corporate law that management, not the shareholders,

23. See generally, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d
1140 (Del. 1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
24. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 556–57 (Del. 1964) (applying the
business judgment rule to determine whether directors should be liable for injury
to shareholders for resisting a hostile takeover).
25. Time Inc., 571 A.2d at 1154.
26. See id. at 1149–50 (“Did Time’s board, having developed a strategic plan
of global expansion to be launched through a business combination with Warner,
come under a fiduciary duty to jettison its plan and put the corporation’s future
in the hands of its shareholders?”).
27. Id. at 1154–55.
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governs the corporation and decides its future.28 The Delaware
judges went further and also rejected the argument that
management ought to be required to use its governance authority
solely to promote shareholder financial interests.29 Instead, the
Delaware Supreme Court held that management’s duty to “the
corporate enterprise” included the power to take nonshareholder
interests into account when faced with a hostile tender offer.30 A
duty to prioritize shareholder interests over those of
nonshareholders was said to arise only in narrowly defined
circumstances that could only occur if a target’s management chose
voluntarily to enter into a transaction that triggered that duty.31
Soon after Professor Johnson and I arrived at W&L, we
realized that we shared the same perspective on the takeover
phenomenon and on the larger question of the social costs of a legal
regime of shareholder primacy. But we came to this perspective
from very different directions. My politics are pretty far to the left
and I have always voted as a Democrat. A legal regime that
emphasized shareholder wealth maximization at the expense of
other corporate stakeholders made no sense to me. Workers in

28. See id. at 1154 (“Delaware law confers the management of the corporate
enterprise to the stockholders’ duly elected representatives . . . . That duty may
not be delegated to the stockholders.” (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(2016))).
29. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953–58 (Del.
1985) (ruling that management may consider factors other than a shareholder’s
financial interest in determining whether to accept a hostile takeover bid).
30. See id. at 955 (noting that directors may take into consideration the
“impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders” when entertaining a hostile
takeover bid).
31. In Revlon (and in subsequent decisions clarifying the Revlon holding),
the court held that management’s duty was to obtain the best price available for
its shareholders, regardless of nonshareholder considerations, when (i) break-up
of the company becomes inevitable because management has initiated an auction
of the company or has chosen to enter into a transaction that will have that result,
or (ii) management enters into a transaction that will result in a change of control.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1985); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del.
1994); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150–51 (Del.
1989). Absent these conditions, management’s duty—at least in the takeover
context—to prioritize shareholder interests over those of nonshareholders does
not apply. And, even within Revlon’s narrow sphere, either triggering situation
depends on a voluntary choice made by the company’s management. In that
important sense, Revlon’s pro-shareholder rule is optional.
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particular lacked the bargaining power to protect their own
interests by means of contract.
Professor Johnson, in contrast, is a conservative, though not
of the stripe that is ascendant today. Values like community,
stability, institutional self-reform, and regard for others animate
his opposition to policies that valorize shareholder wealth
maximization and leave affected nonshareholders to fend for
themselves. Professor Johnson’s religious commitment also led
him to reject arguments based solely on so-called free-market
economics. So, odd as it might seem to those who don’t know us
well, we were both drawn to the dramatic policy challenges
presented by hostile takeovers, and it was an easy alliance from
the start.
The genesis of our first co-authored article was an invitation
from Professor Johnson and his wife to their home in Rockbridge
County not long after I arrived at Washington and Lee. At the
time, there was talk about whether the federal Williams Act32
preempted state legislation restricting takeover activity. Professor
Johnson asked whether, if that were the case, federal law would
also preempt state common law doctrines that allowed corporate
management to block hostile tender offers. When we looked into
the question of preemption of state common law (as opposed to
state statutes), we found that indeed the answer was yes.33 So we
offered a challenge to preemption advocates: Did they really intend
their arguments to go this far?
Soon after that, we looked deeper into the preemption
argument and found it was wrong both as to state statutes and to
common law. In another co-authored article, we examined the
Williams Act’s legislative history and concluded that the United
States Congress did not intend to take a position pro or contra on
the desirability of hostile takeovers.34 That policy question was
assumed to be for the several states to decide for themselves.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)–(e), 78n(d)–(f) (2012).
33. See generally Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Does the Williams Act
Preempt State Common Law in Hostile Takeovers?, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 339 (1989).
34. See generally Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams
Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862 (1989) (reprinted in 33 CORPORATE PRACTICE
COMMENTATOR 221 (1991)). Arguments about legislative intent often mistakenly
conflate the legislature’s assumption about the existence of a particular social
phenomenon with an intention to shore up or encourage that phenomenon.

LOOKING BACK, LOOKING FORWARD

707

In addition to this Article, we wrote several more—some
written together,35 some individually36—about the problem of
shareholder primacy in the hostile takeover context. Professor
Johnson and I sought to illuminate the judicial and legislative
rejection of an approach to takeover regulation that would have
prioritized shareholder interests over those of nonshareholders. As
we explained in one of our articles,37 shareholder primacy in the
35. For examples of our co-authored articles, see generally Lyman Johnson
& David Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 846 (1989) (reprinted in 31 CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 581 (1990)); Lyman
Johnson & David Millon, The Case Beyond Time, 45 BUS. LAW. 2105 (1990);
Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Takeovers and Corporate Law: Who’s
in Control?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1177 (1993).
36. For examples of articles that we wrote individually, see generally Millon,
Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 1; David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A
Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 903 (1988) [hereinafter
Millon, State Takeover Laws]; David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990
DUKE L.J. 201 (1990). See also Lyman Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and
Corporations: Who Are They For?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 781 (1986); Lyman
Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 2215 (1992); Lyman Johnson, Making (Corporate) Law in a
Skeptical World, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161 (1992) (reprinted in 34 CORP. PRAC.
COMMENTATOR 367 (1992)); Lyman Johnson, Sovereignty Over Corporate Stock,
16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 485 (1991) [hereinafter Johnson, Sovereignty Over Corporate
Stock]; Lyman Johnson, State Takeover Statutes: Constitutionality, Community,
and Heresy, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1051 (1988); Lyman Johnson, The Delaware
Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV.
865 (1990) [hereinafter Johnson, Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of
Corporate Life and Corporate Law]; Lyman Johnson, The Eventual Clash Between
Judicial and Legislative Notions of Target Management Conduct, 14 J. CORP. L.
35 (1988) [hereinafter Johnson, The Eventual Clash].
37. Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 34, at 1882–
86. The term “shareholder primacy” first appears in the law reviews in early 1989,
in articles published by Professor Johnson and myself. Millon, State Takeover
Laws, supra note 36, at 904; Johnson, The Eventual Clash, supra note 36, at 76–
86 (outlining the differences in the approaches of legislatures and the courts). The
term has gone on to achieve broad currency in the corporate law academy, both
in this country and abroad. See generally Malcolm Anderson et al., Shareholder
Primacy and Directors’ Duties: An Australian Perspective, 8 J. CORP. L. STUD. 161
(2008) (Austl.); Paul Krüger Andersen & Evelyne J. B. Sørensen, The Principle of
Shareholder Primacy in Company Law from a Nordic and European Regulatory
Perspective, in THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MARKET IN TRANSITION (Hanne
Birkmose, Mette Neville & Karsten Engsig Sørensen eds., 2011) (Neth.); John
Armour, Simon Deakin & Suzanne Konzelmann, Shareholder Primacy and the
Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 531 (2003) (U.K.);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence
Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45 (2002); Gregory Scott Crespi, Rethinking
Corporate Fiduciary Duties: The Inefficiency of the Shareholder Primacy Norm,

708

74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699 (2017)

hostile takeover context had two aspects. It expressed the view
that shareholder interests should take precedence over those of
managers, workers, and other nonshareholders. Seen this way,
there is no necessary implication of shareholder governance
authority; management could be charged with the responsibility to
protect shareholder interests.38 This could mean the power to block
a hostile bid deemed not to be in the shareholders’ financial
interest.39 Shareholder primacy could also suggest, though, that
shareholders ought to have the power to protect their own
interests.40 In the hostile takeover context, this would mean the
power to decide for themselves whether to accept or reject takeover
bids, even if that had the effect of determining the future of the
corporation.41
Neither notion of shareholder primacy got much traction in
the business community, whose leaders favored stability and the
power of corporate managers to do their jobs without external
interference. State legislators also rejected shareholder primacy
for political reasons, being more responsive to local labor and
business interests—both well organized—than to shareholders
living elsewhere and lacking effective lobbying operations. Real
economic hardship for local citizens also trumped abstract ideas
like economic efficiency or freedom of contract. Over forty states
(but not Delaware) therefore enacted statutes that expressly
authorize management to take nonshareholder interests into
account, even at the expense of shareholders.42 And, as noted
55 SMU L. REV. 141 (2002); Martin Gelter, The Pension System and the Rise of
Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909 (2013); Paddy Ireland,
Shareholder Primacy and the Distribution of Wealth, 68 MOD. L. REV. 49 (2005)
(U.K.); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277
(1998) [hereinafter Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm]; Lynn A. Stout, Bad
and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189
(2002). For elaboration on the meaning of shareholder primacy without special
reference to the takeover context, see David Millon, Radical Shareholder
Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013 (2013) [hereinafter Millon, Radical
Shareholder Primacy].
38. Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, supra note 34, at 1882.
39. See id. at 1883 (explaining that management “may go so far as to
thwart a takeover bid—denying shareholders any opportunity to tender—where
deemed necessary to ‘protect’ shareholder interest”).
40. Id. at 1885.
41. Id.
42. See Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, supra note 1, at 225–27 (noting
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above, Delaware’s judicial response to takeover defenses denied
shareholders the power to decide the corporation's future and
rejected the idea (except in the very narrow Revlon context) that
management’s sole duty was to maximize shareholder wealth.43
In the takeover context, shareholder primacy’s stronghold was
in academia. A shareholder primacy approach to this problem
would have required management to favor shareholders over
nonshareholders by abstaining from interference with access to
takeover premia. This was the view advocated by several corporate
law scholars at leading law schools.44 Seen this way, the central
questions for corporate law were the balance of power between
management and shareholders and the optimal mix of legal
intervention versus market-based pressures in regulating that
balance. The underlying assumption that shareholder interests
should take precedence over those of other corporate stakeholders
was taken for granted.
Shareholder primacy’s rejection in the broader society was
pretty uncontroversial and would have happened without
Professor Johnson’s and my scholarly efforts. We do like to think,
though, that our work encouraged other law professors to question
or even reject shareholder primacy at a time when doing so
undoubtedly brought with it significant career advancement costs.
Maybe it was easier to swim upstream in the company of others
than it would have been to do so alone. This group was labeled
“communitarians.” I don’t know where this came from. We didn't
devise the name ourselves, and it may have been intended
derisively, but we didn't mind, and the term offered a convenient
counterpart to the so-called “contractarian,” shareholder primacy
mainstream.
the enactment of these new statutes). See generally Katherine Hale, Note,
Corporate Law and Stakeholders: Moving Beyond Stakeholder Statutes, 45 ARIZ.
L. REV. 823 (2003) [hereinafter Hale, Corporate Law and Stakeholders] (collecting
and commenting on the new legislation).
43. See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text (explaining how the
Delaware courts took a more management-oriented view of corporate
governance).
44. In the context of takeover defenses, the leading articles were Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) and Ronald J. Gilson,
A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).
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III. Shareholder Primacy Today

Since those early years, when our focus was primarily on
hostile takeovers, Professor Johnson and I have continued to argue
against shareholder primacy, both as a description of the law as it
is and also on normative grounds.45
From a normative perspective, shareholder primacy can have
harmful effects on society.46 Business policies designed to
maximize profits can lead to illegal or reckless conduct, as in the
cases of General Motors or BP, for example.47 Even when
corporations act within the law, obsession with profit
maximization can result in harm to the environment, human
rights violations in developing countries, or elaborate tax
avoidance schemes.48 Further, corporations need to have the
discretion to invest in nonshareholder well-being, even where that
involves short-term cost and the long-run financial benefits are
uncertain and hard to quantify. For example, companies may want
to spend money on employee “wellness” in order to enhance loyalty
and productivity and thereby generate long-run value of an
uncertain magnitude.
I agree with those who argue that legislation mandating
socially responsible behavior would be a first-best solution, but
there is essentially zero chance of that happening any time soon.
For that reason, the law should at least give corporate
management the freedom to voluntarily attend to social
considerations even if that means less money for shareholders.
My own recent work has focused on corporate social
responsibility (CSR). Because a CSR conception of management’s
45. Some of my work has been entirely unrelated to corporate law. See, e.g.,
DAVID MILLON, SELECT ECCLESIASTICAL CASES FROM THE KING’S COURTS 1272–
1307 (2009) (documenting medieval ecclesiastical cases bearing on conflicts of
jurisdiction between church and royal courts); David Millon, Juries, Judges, and
Democracy, 18 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 135 (1993) (discussing SHANNON STIMSON, THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE
JOHN MARSHALL (1990)); David Millon, Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (1992) (considering how legal interpretation can be made more
democratic).
46. Johnson, Sovereignty Over Corporate Stock, supra note 36, at 553.
47. David Millon, New Directions in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1373, 1378 (1993).
48. Id.
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function would authorize consideration of nonshareholder as well
as shareholder well-being, I frame CSR as an alternative to
shareholder primacy. The importance of CSR, in my view, is the
potential for management of multinational enterprises to reject
policies and practices—sometimes but not always legal—that
enrich shareholders but harm the environment and violate human
rights. I have considered the CSR alternative to shareholder
primacy from three angles. First is the question of whether U.S.
corporate
law—especially
Delaware—allows
corporate
management to deviate from shareholder wealth maximization in
order to pursue environmental rights, human rights, and other
values. Second, I have examined alternative conceptions of CSR,
distinguishing between policies based purely on ethical
considerations and those that have the potential to enhance
corporate profits and long-run survival. Finally, I have written
about the non-legal pressures that discourage voluntary adoption
of CSR policies. I consider each of these issues in the remainder of
this Part.
A. Shareholder Primacy and Contemporary Corporate Law
With respect to what the law is now, I and others (including
Professors Johnson49 and Bruner50) think corporate law—
including Delaware’s—already gives management the freedom to
deviate from profit maximization where necessary to promote
business policies responsive to social considerations.51 The law is,
49. See generally Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate
Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405 (2013);
Johnson, Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate
Law, supra note 36.
50. See generally Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of
Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385 (2008).
51. This was the main point of our recent article on the Supreme Court’s
controversial Burwell v. Hobby Lobby decision. Lyman Johnson & David Millon,
Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1 (2015) [hereinafter Johnson &
Millon, Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby]. We did not take a position on the
broader question of the desirability of exempting corporations from Obamacare
(or other federal mandates) on religious grounds. Rather, we looked at the
decision from the perspective of state corporate law. Id. at 1. Our central point
was that the majority’s understanding of state corporate law (despite its
somewhat opaque and incoherent exposition) as permitting incorporators to
define business purpose in ways other than profit maximization is correct. Id. at
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in our view, essentially agnostic on the question of corporate
purpose. It accords broad discretion to the corporation’s board and
senior management to decide how zealously the company should
pursue profit, when it should voluntarily undertake strategies or
projects that do not have profit maximization as their primary
objective, and when long-term gains should be preferred over
short-term ones.52
With respect to existing law, it should first be noted that
Delaware’s corporation statute53 nowhere mandates that
corporations must be managed so as to maximize shareholder
wealth. Nor, despite frequent statements to the contrary, does it
refer to Delaware business corporations as “for-profit” entities.
Instead, the statute states expressly that “[a] corporation may be
incorporated or organized under this chapter to conduct or promote
any lawful business or purposes.”54
Only a few Delaware cases address the question of corporate
purpose. One recent trial court opinion speaks of shareholder
wealth maximization as a statutory mandate, despite the absence
of statutory language to that effect.55 The case turned on the
question of whether the founders of craigslist, a corporation formed
pursuant to the Delaware business corporation statute, were free
to define the purpose of the business as something other than profit
maximization.56 The three founders of the company chose
deliberately, as a community service, to provide potentially
lucrative publication of classified advertising free of charge to the
advertisers.57 One of the three founders later sold his minority
20–23.
52. Despite the absence of a shareholder primacy legal mandate, there is no
real doubt that management will pursue profitable business strategies because
there are plenty of market-based incentives to do so, including the need to raise
capital in a competitive market, executive compensation arrangements that
reward financial performance, and the need for the company’s long-run survival
in competitive product and service markets. The absence of a legal maximization
requirement does not, in other words, present a serious threat that corporations
will disregard profit-seeking in a substantial way. It does mean, though, that they
are free to do so in response to competing considerations.
53. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101-15 (2011).
54. Id. § 101(b).
55. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 7–8.
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interest to eBay, which of course purchased those shares with
knowledge that craigslist did not seek to maximize financial
return.58 eBay’s objective was eventually to acquire control of
craigslist and reorient its business model so as to maximize its
substantial earnings potential.59 When craigslist’s remaining
founders learned that eBay was engaged in competition with it,
they implemented measures designed to prevent eBay from
gaining control of their company and changing its mission.60
Holding that this action amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty,
the court stated that, “[h]aving chosen a for-profit form, the
craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards
that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to
promote the value of the corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders.”61 As an observation of business reality, this is
obvious
and
unremarkable—all
corporations,
including
non-profits, must “promote the company’s value” in order to
survive. But even this fact of life finds no mandate in the
corporation statute, which, again, does not refer to businesses
organized under it as “for-profit” entities. But the court then
proceeded to make a much bolder claim, asserting that corporate
policies—like craigslist’s—that seek not to maximize the economic
value of a Delaware business corporation for the benefit of its
stockholders are invalid.62 In other words, according to this
decision, not only does the statute—implicitly though not
explicitly—mandate promotion of the company’s economic value, it
also requires maximization. So, according to this court, someone
who buys shares in an existing corporation with notice that the
business does not seek to maximize profits can demand a change
in that company’s mission.63 That could only be because the
58. Id. at 11.
59. Id. at 9–17.
60. Id. at 21–24.
61. Id. at 34.
62. See id. at 35 (“Directors of a for-profit Delaware corporation cannot
deploy a rights plan to defend a business strategy that openly eschews
stockholder wealth maximization—at least not consistently with the directors’
fiduciary duties under Delaware law.”).
63. The key fact that eBay invested in craigslist knowing that the company
did not seek to maximize profits and instead sought to provide a community
service distinguishes that case from cases like Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W.
668 (Mich. 1919). In that famous case, the court rejected Henry Ford's efforts to
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Delaware corporation law does not allow private individuals to
choose voluntarily to organize a business for any purpose other
than profit maximization.64 As noted, the statute itself says no
such thing and in fact authorizes incorporation “to conduct or
promote any lawful business or purposes.”65 As authority for a
shareholder primacy conception of corporate purpose, this decision
simply asserts its conclusion apodictically. No reasons are given
why people like the craigslist founders should be disabled from
tempering profit-seeking with social considerations, particularly
when the complaining minority shareholder invested in the
corporation with full knowledge of its community service mission.
The very few other cases cited in support of the shareholder
primacy proposition offer even weaker support for it. There is, of
course Dodge v. Ford,66 in which the Michigan Supreme Court
stated, without citation of authority, that
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the shareholders. The powers of the directors are to
be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits,
or the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order to
devote them to other purposes. 67

That decision, beloved as it may be by many corporate law
academics, has only been cited three times by Delaware courts and
never for its celebrated declaration on corporate purpose.
As noted above, in the well-known Revlon decision,68 the
Delaware Supreme Court does define management’s duty in terms
reorient the company’s mission away from profit maximization for the sake of
workers and consumers. The minority shareholders, however, had invested in the
company with a reasonable expectation that the Ford Motor Co. would be run
primarily in the financial interest of its shareholders. There was a legitimate
gripe, therefore, that Ford had used his powers of control to “change the rules” in
the middle of the game. In that sense, Dodge v. Ford can be described as a
minority shareholder oppression case, see generally Smith, The Shareholder
Primacy Norm, supra note 37, but the craigslist case cannot.
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 101–15 (2011).
65. Id. § 101(b).
66. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
67. Id. at 683.
68. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1985).
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of maximizing the short-term price of the corporation's shares.69
Importantly, though, the decision addresses only the hostile
takeover context and applies only when a corporation's board
approves a transaction that will cause either a change of control or
the break-up of the company.70 By implication, then, beyond those
two circumstances there is no such duty. The Delaware Supreme
Court had already said as much with regard to takeover defenses,
expressly authorizing consideration of nonshareholder interests in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.71 and, in Time/Warner,
endorsing the authority of corporate management to determine the
corporation's future despite conflicting shareholder preferences.72
And, in addition to the expressly narrow reach of Revlon is the
important fact that either of the circumstances in which its
mandate does apply can occur only when a corporation's board
chooses voluntarily to enter into one or the other type of
transaction.73
As far as the case law allegedly supporting shareholder
primacy is concerned, that’s about it.74 One could go further and
69. See id. at 182 (“The duty of the board had thus changed from the
preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company’s
value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefit.”).
70. See Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 1994)
(“It is the significance of [a change of control or a break-up of a company] that
justifies: (a) focusing on the directors’ obligation to seek the best value reasonably
available to the stockholders; and (b) requiring close scrutiny of board action
which could be contrary to the stockholders’ interests.”).
71. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting that a board can consider
constituencies besides shareholders).
72. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150–51
(Del. 1989) (explaining that a board can consider “long-term” values and “is not
under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term”).
73. Because it requires immediate share price maximization, it is hard to see
how this decision could support the argument that Delaware law requires
long-term maximization of firm value. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., The
Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding of the Power and
Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law,
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761 (2015) [hereinafter Strine, The Dangers of Denial].
74. A Delaware trial court opinion states in passing that “[i]t is the obligation
of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the
corporation’s stockholders.” Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch.
1986). However, that case dealt with the legal rights of corporate bondholders and
therefore did not address the question of the claims of shareholders versus those
of other corporate constituencies. Even taken at face value, the statement rejects
the idea that shareholders are entitled to short-term share price maximization.
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point to features of corporate law that seem to indicate lack of
commitment to shareholder primacy. Fiduciary duty law’s
business judgment rule accords directors very broad discretion to
run the company as they think best. As long as the claim is at least
superficially plausible, directors can justify a range of policies—
including policies that seem to favor nonshareholders at the
expense of shareholders—by reference to long-run benefit to the
corporation. Only serious cases of self-dealing or near total neglect
of
responsibility
can
lead
to
accountability,
and
75
statutorily-authorized exculpation provisions included in most
corporate charters eliminate monetary liability for breach of the
duty of care. Further, while corporate law gives rights to
shareholders—including voting rights, the right to bring
derivative suits, and rights of access to corporate information—
that are not available to other constituent groups, in practice these
rights are very weak mechanisms for imposing discipline on
corporate management. As Professor Bainbridge has written,
“[s]hareholder control rights are so weak that they scarcely qualify
as part of corporate governance.”76
As noted above, over forty states have enacted so-called
constituency statutes.77 Using various linguistic formulations,
these statutes expressly authorize corporate management to take
nonshareholder interests into consideration even at the expense of
shareholder wealth.78 To that extent these statutes are an express
repudiation of shareholder primacy. Delaware does not have one,
but one might say that if the statute and case law are already
agnostic on the question of corporate purpose and the law already
accords very broad discretion to corporate management, no such
75. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2015).
76. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 569 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge,
Director Primacy].
77. Sources cited supra note 42 and accompanying text.
78. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (2017) (“[T]he board of
directors, in considering the best interests of the corporation, may consider in
addition to the interests of the corporation’s shareholders . . . corporation’s
employees, suppliers, creditors and customers . . . [c]ommunity and societal
considerations . . . .”); N.Y. BUS. CORP. L. § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 2017)
(allowing a director to consider “the effects that the corporation’s actions may
have in the short-term or in the long-term upon” nonshareholder constituencies
such as “employees” and “customers and creditors”).
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statute would be necessary. In the one area where the shareholder
primacy idea was most urgent, the Delaware Supreme Court
granted broad discretion to corporate management to defend
against hostile takeovers in the interests both of nonshareholder
constituencies and long-run strategic planning,79 at least as long
as there were some “rationally related benefits” for shareholders.80
That restriction is too vague to provide a vehicle for judicial review
of management decisions. Judicial decisions, in other words, may
have obviated the need for legislative action in Delaware.
Having said all this, it remains a fact that a number of
scholars deeply versed in Delaware corporate law are convinced
that shareholder primacy is indeed a legal mandate.81 This deep
disagreement about a foundational question has always struck me
as a very puzzling feature of the corporate law landscape. I
suggested in a recent Article that part of the reason for this could
be the ambiguous meaning of the shareholder primacy term.82 In
that Article, I used the term “radical shareholder primacy” to refer
to the notion that corporate management is the agent of the
shareholders, charged with maximizing their wealth.83 Viewed
from an agency perspective, the primary challenge for corporate
law is to render management accountable to the shareholders.
Some scholars therefore argue that law reform is needed in order
to empower shareholders and thereby reduce agency costs.84
Others are more inclined to view current arrangements as optimal
because of the widespread adoption of the corporate form despite
79. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989)
(discussing when Unocal duties attach); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting that whether a defensive measure is reasonable
can include the impact on “‘constituencies’ other than shareholders”).
80. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176
(Del. 1985).
81. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing
Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital Markets, 108
COLUM. L. REV. 231 (2008); Henry Hansman & Reinier Kraakman, The End of
History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001); Edward B. Rock, Adapting to
the New Shareholder-Centric Reality, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1907 (2013); supra note
76; infra note 84
82. Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, supra note 37, at 1016–17.
83. Id. at 1018–19.
84. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder
Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005).
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the “separation between ownership and control” characteristic of
public corporations.85 They are likely to point to market-based
mechanisms that enhance accountability, perhaps limiting calls
for law reform to new rules that would stimulate a more active
hostile takeover market.86 Scholars in the radical shareholder
primacy camp, despite their disagreements over specific law
reform proposals, nevertheless share the assumption that
corporate management is the agent of the shareholders.
The agency conception of shareholder primacy originated in
the late 1970s, when economically oriented legal scholars turned
to cutting edge scholarship produced by financial economists.
Economists wrote of a principal-agent relationship but did not
seem to have had the legal idea of agency in mind and seemed
instead to have been thinking generally about situations in which
one person acts for another. The legal conception of an agency
relation implies more than that, including the principal’s power of
control over the agent and fiduciary obligation running from the
agent to the principal. Legal scholars took the economists’ looser
notion of agency and imported it into corporate law by
characterizing the relationship between management and the
shareholders in terms of agency law.87 This implied a right of
control and a fiduciary obligation running from management
directly to the shareholders (rather than to the corporate entity).
Seen from this perspective, agency cost reduction became the
central problem of corporate law.88
Critics of shareholder primacy are correct in their view that
this extreme version of shareholder primacy is not the law. There
is no legal basis for the agency idea in this context because the
relationship between the board of directors and senior officers on
the one hand and the shareholders on the other does not conform
to the definition of an agency relation.89 While agency law insists

85. Hansman & Kraakman, supra note 81, at 440.
86. See generally Rock, supra note 81, at 1923–25.
87. See Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the
Rhetoric of Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1428–30 (1985) (discussing the
agency argument)
88. See id. at 1428–30 (outlining the limits of an agency approach).
89. See id. at 1428–30 (describing the various ways that these two
relationships are different).
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on the principal’s right of control over the agent,90 corporate law
expressly provides that the board of directors, not the
shareholders, manages the corporation.91 Shareholders possess no
legal mechanism for telling the board what to do. At best, they can
exercise their voting rights to replace a board if they disapprove of
its exercise of control but they cannot dictate how that power
should actually be exercised. Further, in the modern publicly held
corporation, shareholders typically lack the knowledge and
expertise to exercise control over management, and most have no
desire to do so. Efforts to control the board would in any event be
subject to collective action costs, including the accommodation of
heterogeneous preferences.
There is, however, a more limited sense in which shareholders
do enjoy primacy, though only with respect to their place within
the legal framework of corporate governance. Shareholders alone
among the corporation’s various constituencies enjoy voting rights
with respect to election of directors and approval of fundamental
changes, rights of access to corporate books and records and the
list of shareholders, and the right to bring derivative suits. This
model I refer to as “traditional shareholder primacy.”
Disagreement over whether shareholder primacy is the law
today is due at least in part to these two different meanings of the
term. Those who insist that shareholder primacy is the law are
correct, but in a limited sense. Traditional shareholder primacy is
the law today, but it doesn't amount to much, and says nothing
expressly about a shareholder wealth maximization mandate.
Meanwhile, those who deny that shareholder primacy is the law
are correct to the extent that corporate law does not embrace the
agency model. They need, however, to acknowledge that
long-standing features of current corporate law do lend themselves
to a shareholder primacy characterization. But, there is no need to
90. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (defining
agency); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (defining
agency); ROBERT C. CLARK, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 56–59 (John W. Pratt & Richard J.
Zeckhauser eds., 1985); see also Brudney, supra note 87, at 1428–30 (outlining
the limits of an agency approach).
91. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2016); see also Paramount Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149–51 (Del. 1989) (“Delaware law confers the
management of the corporate enterprise to the stockholders’ duly elected board
representatives.”).
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resist seeing corporate law as reflecting the traditional
shareholder primacy model because traditional shareholder
primacy does not demand shareholder wealth maximization.
Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine, in his
paper for this Symposium,92 argues that the Delaware statute’s
conferral of governance rights upon shareholders indicates an
implicit requirement that corporations prioritize shareholder
interests over those of other stakeholders, who lack such rights.
History explains why this argument doesn’t work. Toward the
middle of the nineteenth century, when corporations began to
replace partnerships for organization of businesses, these firms
were closely held entities analogous to general partnerships.93 It
therefore was natural that shareholders but not nonshareholders
(except by delegation from shareholders) should enjoy governance
powers, just as partnership law conferred exclusive governance
powers on general partners.94 And, analogously to partnership law,
for much of the nineteenth century corporate law presumed one
vote per shareholder rather than one vote per share, unless
provided otherwise by the corporate charter or by statute.95
Just as partnership law left it to the partners to decide what
purposes the firm should pursue, corporate law accorded the same
power to shareholders.96 Before the advent of general incorporation
statutes beginning around the middle of the nineteenth century,
formation of a corporation required a special act of the
legislature.97 The incorporators defined the purposes that the firm
was to pursue and were free to decide the extent to which profit
maximization was to be the primary objective; no generally
applicable statute or common law doctrine restricted this power.
When incorporation pursuant to general statutes replaced special
92. Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power is Corporate Purpose II: An
Encouragement for Future Consideration from Professors Johnson and Millon, 74
WASH. & LEE L. REV 1163 (2017).
93. Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, supra note 37, at 291.
94. Id.
95. See Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights
from the History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347,
1354–55 (2006) (explaining how this democratic system was extremely common
in American and English law).
96. Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, supra note 37, at 297.
97. See id. at 295 (describing early chartering requirements).
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chartering, corporations were still small in scale and their stock
closely held; large publicly held entities did not begin to achieve
dominance until the last decades of the nineteenth century.98 Early
general incorporation statutes—like their modern successors—did
not mandate profit maximization. Delaware’s first general
incorporation law, enacted in 1875, authorized incorporation for
“charitable” as well as other specified purposes, including
religious, literary, and manufacturing purposes.99 Just as they
were able to do under the special chartering regime, it seems to
have been assumed that incorporators ought to have the freedom
to define corporate purpose according to their own preferences.
This made sense in a world of closely held firms because, as a
practical matter, the shareholders—or at least a majority of
them—had the ability to decide such questions for themselves.
Rather than implying a particular conception of corporate purpose,
the shareholders’ governance monopoly seems instead to have
obviated any need for statutory specification. If the shareholders
wanted to maximize profits, they could commit the firm to that
objective through the exercise of their powers of control. But this
legal regime also gave them discretion to manage the firm so as to
pursue other objectives.
The nineteenth-century statutory framework—shareholder
governance monopoly without a shareholder primacy mandate—
has survived essentially intact. Once large, publicly traded entities
became commonplace after the turn of the twentieth century,
shareholder governance powers lost much of their practical
efficacy. This was the result of “the separation between ownership
and control.”100 At this point, a statutory requirement of
98. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 285–89 (1977).
99. Act of Jan. 28, 1875, ch. 119, § 1, 15 Del. Laws 3. This statute was
replaced by a thoroughly revised statute in 1883. Act of March 14, 1883, ch. 147,
17 Del. Laws 212. The 1883 statute, like its modern successors, defined powers
that corporations might exercise but included no provisions as to the purposes
that corporations might lawfully pursue. In 1899 a new statute—modeled on New
Jersey’s—replaced the earlier one. Act of March 9, 1899, ch. 273, 21 Del. Laws
445. This statute authorized formation of corporations “for the transaction of any
lawful business, or to promote or conduct any legitimate object or purpose” but,
like its predecessors, said nothing about profit maximization.” Id. § 1. For a
history of the Delaware statutes, see generally S. Samuel Arsht, A History of the
Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (1976).
100. See generally ADOLF BERLE, JR. & GARDNER MEANS, THE MODERN
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shareholder primacy might have seemed desirable if that were the
policy objective, because the shareholders no longer had the
practical ability to determine questions of corporate purpose. The
Delaware legislature has chosen not to do this, instead retaining
the long-standing statutory agnosticism. Perhaps the lawmakers
prefer not to intrude upon managerial discretion, a value of
foundational importance in Delaware law. Whatever the reason
may be, the shareholders’ governance monopoly does not now
imply a shareholder wealth maximization requirement because it
never did.
Despite the reading of Delaware law I’ve presented here, it
remains a fact that a number of scholars deeply versed in Delaware
corporate law—including Chief Justice Strine, a corporate law
scholar of the highest rank—are convinced that shareholder
primacy is indeed a legal mandate. Thus, when Chief Justice
Strine writes that Delaware law requires that corporate directors
“must make stockholder welfare their sole end, and that other
interests may be taken into consideration only as a means of
promoting stockholder welfare,”101 people who care about these
questions must pay attention.
This is a debate that is not going to be resolved by reference to
statutory and case law. The interpretive arguments are familiar
and neither side seems inclined to change its mind. Perhaps
though, debating the legal authority for shareholder primacy
misses the point. If the Delaware judges are convinced that
shareholder primacy is the law, challenging the authority for that
position is not going to gain traction and may even be beside the
point. Statements in law review articles by Chief Justice Strine—
which otherwise might seem to be a problematic venue for
resolving controversial legal questions102—then become useful
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (explaining managerial autonomy
due to wisely dispersed share ownership).
101. Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 73, at 768. Chief Justice
Strine’s version of shareholder primacy would not require directors to maximize
current share price. Rather it would require that they maximize the financial
interests of shareholders in the long run. Id. at 766–67.
102. One might question whether it is appropriate for judges to attempt to
clarify hotly debated questions of law by means of law review articles. Ordinarily,
we look to legislatures to revise the law and to judges deciding actual cases to
clarify its meaning. For judicial law-making, the adversarial process at work in a
particular controversy with real stakes for the parties provides the occasion for
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evidence of the judiciary’s understanding of the law, more useful
than the statute and cases.
The point here is akin to an older argument about the nature
of law. For Sir William Blackstone, the great eighteenth-century
English jurist, law consisted of customary principles resting upon
“general reception and usage.”103 These principles were to be
identified and explained by judges, “the depository of the laws; the
living oracles.”104 Cases themselves were not law, only “evidence”
of what the law is.105 According to this view, Chief Justice Strine
and his colleagues on the bench—whose knowledge is shaped by
experience and study and whose work is guided by their oath of
office106—enjoy privileged access to the meaning of the law’s
principles and it is their opinions about what the law is that count;
arguments among mere academics about the implications of
particular cases or statutes may actually be irrelevant.107
Even if this is so, Chief Justice Strine’s definition of corporate
purpose in terms of long-run profit maximization rather than of
short-term share price108 may go a long way toward satisfying
critics of shareholder primacy. Coupled with the business
judgment rule’s broad deference to good faith managerial
decisionmaking, the practical effect may be to allow management
to sacrifice profits for the sake of competing considerations in many
cases. Courts are unlikely to second-guess facially plausible claims
of long-run financial benefit, for example, in the form of
reasoned argument and debate between contrasting positions. The judicial
process at the appellate level requires collegial collaboration and the give and
take that that can require, especially important in Delaware where there is a
strong tradition of unanimity in the Supreme Court. And the requirement of
publication ensures that opinions in controversial cases draw public scrutiny that
judges generally are unable to ignore however hard they might try. In contrast, a
law review article written by an author who identifies himself by reference to his
judicial office inevitably carries significant authority despite the unofficial venue
and despite the absence of institutional mechanisms that constrain and shape
judicial opinions.
103. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68.
104. Id. at *69.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. In this regard, note Chief Justice Strine’s reference to “accomplished
[Delaware] jurists” like Chancellor William Allen, Chancellor William Chandler,
and Justice Andrew Moore. Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 73, at 776.
108. Id.
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reputational gains to be realized from being a “good corporate
citizen.”
B. Voluntary CSR
Given the law’s flexibility as a practical matter (and perhaps
doctrinally as well), it seems evident that corporate management
possesses broad discretion to pursue socially valuable objectives,
even if such pursuits come at the expense of the shareholders. Of
course, corporations must make money to survive, but that fact of
life still leaves management with substantial space within which
to promote social welfare in appropriate cases, including, for
example, employee well-being, the human rights of those affected
by corporate activities, and environmental concerns.
I would prefer to see law reform both external and internal to
corporate law that would address the relations between
corporations and society more directly. Leaving it up to corporate
management to make these choices in a world of conflicting
pressures, extra-legal norms that encourage devotion to
shareholders, and varying levels of commitment to social welfare
values is a decidedly second-best solution. But, since meaningful
law reform in this context seems to be something of a pipedream,
and as long as corporations continue to generate social costs—or at
least ignore them despite their ability to do much better—it seems
to me appropriate to think about whether corporations might use
their legal freedom to act in a socially responsible manner even in
the absence of legal mandate.
In thinking about the prospects for voluntary CSR, I find it
helpful to identify two different conceptions or models of CSR. I
have referred to these as the “ethical” and “strategic” models of
CSR.109 The likelihood of voluntary adoption of CSR business
policies may differ depending on which model one has in mind,
109. David Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental
Sustainability, in COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY: LEGAL BARRIERS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 35, 41–46, 65–71 (Beate Sjåfjell & Benjamin J. Richardson eds.,
2015) [hereinafter Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental
Sustainability]. In an earlier article, I used the terms “constituency” and
“sustainability” to refer to the “ethical” and “strategic” models. David Millon, Two
Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 523, 523–525
(2011).
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although it turns out that there are strong disincentives to
acceptance of both versions.110
“Ethical” CSR posits that management owes a duty to respect
the welfare of all the corporation’s stakeholders.111 In addition to
shareholders, these include workers, creditors, suppliers,
customers, and those affected by the corporation’s impact on the
environment.112 Management’s duty is to take the interests of one
or more of these nonshareholder constituencies into account when
it is appropriate to do so, even if that comes at the expense of the
shareholders.113 This can mean avoiding conduct that, while within
legal bounds, is harmful to some stakeholder groups, such as
profitable business activity that is harmful to the environment. 114
Corporations may also, for example, act affirmatively to alleviate
suffering in a developing country in which they do business.
Ethical CSR does not specify when and how such trade-off
decisions are to be made. Scholars primarily in the field of business
ethics
have
developed
normative
theories
to
guide
115
decisionmakers, but the vast range of circumstances in which
these questions can arise and the complexity of the relevant ethical
considerations make generalizable, rule-like prescriptions
impossible.
To this it is commonly objected that according management
such broad power without meaningful guidance as to how that
power should be exercised is a recipe for unaccountable discretion
that may end up benefiting no one but the managers themselves.
While there may be truth to this complaint, it does not seem to me
that the antidote is to mandate shareholder wealth maximization
110. Infra Part III.C.
111. Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental
Sustainability, supra note 109, at 64.
112. Id. at 62.
113. Id. at 60–63.
114. See id. at 62 (“For example, management may decide to install expensive
new equipment to decrease air pollution even though it is not legally required to
do so. The public stands to benefit, but the added expense will reduce
shareholders’ profits, at least in the near term.”).
115. See SUZANNE BENN & DIANE BOLTON, KEY CONCEPTS IN CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 13–17 (2011) (describing various ethical constructs,
including ethical egoism, virtue ethics, deontological ethics, consequentialist
ethics, rights-based ethics, justice-based ethics, cultural relativism, and
postmodern ethics, as relevant frameworks within which to discuss CSR).
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without regard for the resulting social costs that may be inflicted
on nonshareholders.
“Strategic” CSR is based on the idea that, under certain
circumstances, business decisions that benefit nonshareholder
constituencies can enhance shareholder wealth in the long run.116
The justification therefore is instrumental, in the sense that
policies benefiting nonshareholders are undertaken to further the
financial interests of the corporation and its shareholders rather
than out of a sense of ethical obligation. This has been referred to
as the “business case” for CSR.117
There are plenty of real world examples of companies that
have invested in the well-being of workers, suppliers, and others
affected by their activities, resulting in enhanced productivity and
output.118 In a similar vein, numerous companies have used
process and product design innovation to reduce costs while also
contributing to environmental sustainability.119 Importantly, a
recent, well-designed empirical study provides impressive
evidence of the potential financial benefits and competitive
advantages to be realized from voluntary adoption of socially and
environmentally responsible business policies.120
116. Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental
Sustainability, supra note 109, at 65.
117. Id.
118. See generally Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Creating Shared
Value: How to Reinvent Capitalism—and Unleash a Wave of Innovation and
Growth, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan.–Feb. 2011), https://hbr.org/2011/01/the-big-ideacreating-shared-value (last visisted Mar. 11, 2017) (explaining how numerous
companies, such as General Electric, Google, IBM, Intel, Johnson & Johnson, and
others have been following the “principle of shared value, which involves creating
economic value in a way that also creates value for society by addressing its needs
and challenges”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Michael E.
Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Strategy and Society: The Link Between Competitive
Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2006),
https://hbr.org/2006/12/strategy-and-society-the-link-between-competitiveadvantage-and-corporate-social-responsibility (last visited May 2, 2017)
(describing the CSR activities of General Electric, Toyota, and other companies)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
119. See Ram Nidumolu, C.K. Prahalad & M.R. Rangaswarmi, Why
Sustainability is Now the Key Driver of Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV. (Sept. 2009),
https://hbr.org/2009/09/why-sustainability-is-now-the-key-driver-of-innovation
(last visited May 2, 2017) (describing how the pressure to develop sustainable
business systems has driven innovation that results in cost-saving) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
120. See generally Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The
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C. Obstacles to Voluntary CSR
Despite evidence of the potential financial benefits of strategic
CSR and although corporate management enjoys broad discretion
within the law’s loose limits to pursue CSR policies, a number of
extra-legal factors operate to discourage voluntary adoption of
strategic as well as ethical CSR policies. The culture of business—
expressed in widely held assumptions as well as social norms—
tends to discourage decisions that are not designed to maximize
current shareholder value.121 Business leaders typically assume
that that is their primary responsibility.122 Reinforcing this
assumption is the prevalence of equity-based executive
compensation in the form of stock grants and options. These
incentives reward enhanced share prices achieved through strong
short-term earnings, while failure to meet earnings targets can
cost CEOs their jobs.123 Beyond the board room and executive
suite, prominent graduate schools of business promote a
shareholder primacy vision of management’s responsibility.124 The
business press likewise tends to take this idea for granted.125
Impact of Corporate Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance,
60 MGMT. SCI. 2835 (2014).
121. Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental
Sustainability, supra note 109, at 53, 55–56.
122. See generally ASPEN INSTITUTE, UNPACKING CORPORATE PURPOSE: A
REPORT ON THE BELIEFS OF EXECUTIVES, INVESTORS AND SCHOLARS 11–13 (2014),
https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/upload/Unpacking
_Corporate_Purpose_May_2014_0.pdf [hereinafter ASPEN INSTITUTE]; BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2012, at 30 (2012),
http://businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/BRT_Principles_of_ Corporate_
Governance_-2012_Formatted_Final.pdf.
123. See Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How has CEO Turnover
Changed?, 12 INT’L REV. FIN. 57, 82–83 (2012) (describing how likelihood of a
CEO’s termination has grown more tightly correlated to stock performance since
2000).
124. ASPEN INSTITUTE, supra note 122, at 37; see also RAKESH KHURANA, FROM
HIGHER AIMS TO HIGHER HANDS: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A
PROFESSION 364 (2007) (“Inside business schools . . . faculties used principal–
agent theory to recast the role of management. Instead of being responsible to
multiple stakeholders . . . , managers were now said to be responsible only to
shareholders . . . .”).
125. See, e.g., Aneel Karnani, The Case Against Corporate Social
Responsibility, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052748703338004575230112664504890 (last visited Feb. 20,
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An especially strong disincentive to voluntary adoption of CSR
policies is pressure from institutional shareholders.126 This is
particularly so in the case of large public and private pension
funds. As a group, public funds own approximately eight percent
of the U.S. stock market.127 The largest of these are huge. The
California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), for
example, has assets worth $290 billion and current obligations to
over 600,000 retirees and contingent obligations to over 1.2 million
members who are not yet retired.128 Public pension funds, and
private ones too, necessarily have very long time horizons because
of their obligations to future retirees, so they are often referred to
as the ultimate long-term investors. Nevertheless, these
institutions are also subject to huge obligations to current
beneficiaries, who are entitled to a check each month.129 These
institutions are therefore under strong pressure to maximize
short-term returns on their portfolios, as are employer-sponsored
defined benefit pension plans.
Mutual funds also face pressures that encourage insistence on
short-term returns.130 For most funds, fees are a function of total
assets under management.131 In the competition for investor
dollars, growth and similar styles of mutual fund emphasize
current performance because year-to-year results strongly
influence investors’ decisions to move money into or out of

2017) (“The movement for better corporate governance . . . demands that
managers fulfill their fiduciary duty to act in the shareholders’ interest.”).
126. See generally David Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911 (2013) [hereinafter Millon, Shareholder Social
Responsibility].
127. Id. at 913
128. OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS CAL. PUB. EMPS.’ RET. SYS., CALPERS FACTS AT A
GLANCE 1–5 (June 30, 2015), https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/formspublications/facts-at-a-glance.pdf. Nearly two-thirds of CalPERS’ portfolio is
invested in public and private equities.
129. See id. at 1 (showing that for CalPERS, the average monthly payment is
$2,627).
130. See Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 126, at 934–
36.
131. Id. at 934.
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particular funds.132 Publicly available year-end rankings seem to
be especially important.133
Pension funds and mutual funds that follow short-term
investment strategies tend to favor companies focused on strong
quarter-to-quarter accounting results.134 They exert pressure to
meet earnings targets through exercise of voting rights, informal
behind-the-scenes engagement, or the threat of large-scale sell-offs
that will reduce share price. Managers of underperforming
companies face pay cuts, lower bonuses, or even termination.135
The implications for voluntary CSR are clear. All shareholders
focused on financial return tend to be hostile toward ethical CSR,
which spends money or foregoes investment to promote social
values, despite the negative impact on shareholder wealth.136
Importantly, shareholders focused on short-term results also
present an obstacle to strategically deployed CSR.137 This is so
even though strategic CSR justifies investment in nonshareholder
well-being by reference to corporations’ financial self-interest.138
The problem here is one of time.139 Investments in nonshareholder
well-being will typically involve current expense that reduces
current earnings and therefore, in today’s investment
environment, threatens share price.140 Even if in the long-run the
financial pay-offs can more than make up for the short-term cost,
shareholders under pressure to generate short-term gains will be
unwilling to wait.141 Companies concerned about current earnings
132. Id.
133. Keith C. Brown et al., Of Tournaments and Temptations: An Analysis of
Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry, 51 J. FIN. 85, 87–88 (1996).
134. See Brian Bushee, Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings
over Long-Run Value?, 18 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 207, 213–15 (2001) (discussing
the relationship between the length of investment horizon and the reporting
period by investors).
135. See Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 126, at 915–16
(outlining the various penalties corporate managers face for poor performance).
136. Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental
Sustainability, supra note 109, at 43.
137. Id. at 71.
138. Id. at 65.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 65–66.
141. See id. at 57 (“[T]his leads to a strong preference for investments in
companies that generate superior short-term earnings and against those whose
value includes a significant long-term component. . . . The threat of replacement
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and share price will therefore be reluctant to make investments
that only generate returns years down the road.142 This is why even
strategically motivated CSR can meet with opposition.
In short, careful thinking about shareholder primacy and its
implications for CSR leads to some disappointing conclusions.
With respect to the law on the shareholder primacy question, even
though the legal authority for a shareholder primacy mandate is
questionable and controversial, it may not matter if those in
positions of authority—the Delaware judiciary—are convinced
that it is the law. Further, even distinguishing strategic from
ethical CSR, in the hope that at least the former version might
have some viability, is problematic because of pressures from
powerful institutional shareholders who prefer strong current
share prices to long-term gains.
IV. What Difference Have We Made?
After thirty years of writing about corporate law, one can’t
help but wonder what difference it might have made. Early in my
academic career, a colleague at another law school said that a
scholar’s goal should be to change the way people think about his
or her field. He didn’t mean persuading everyone to see things the
same way. What he meant was a reorientation of the scholarly
conversation: new notions of what’s important and what the
relevant questions should be. Changing the terms of the debate.
In some respects, academic corporate law hasn’t changed a
great deal over the past thirty years. Many prominent scholars
assume that shareholder wealth maximization is the relevant
benchmark.143 For them, the key questions continue to revolve
around the balance of power between shareholders and
management. Some argue that managerial discretion best serves

motivates mutual fund managers to meet or beat performance
benchmarks. . . . [a]nd [prioritize] short-term returns.”).
142. See id. at 58 (“Even if long-term economic benefits are achievable, the
immediate negative impact on earnings and potentially on share prices may
discourage management from moving forward.”).
143. Id. at 59.
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that objective144 while others insist that empowerment of
shareholders will improve managerial performance.145
Even so, it strikes me as undeniable that the landscape has
changed in important ways. There is today a serious debate over
whether shareholder primacy is a legal mandate as well as a
desirable policy goal. While the idea of CSR seems not to enjoy the
traction in the United States that it does in the United Kingdom
and Western Europe,146 a number of scholars are exploring
conceptions of corporate purpose and management responsibility
that go beyond one-dimensional conceptions of shareholder
primacy.147 There is now a serious conversation about shareholder
primacy that wasn’t happening when Professor Johnson and I
started to work together way back in the late 1980s. Shareholder
primacy now appears—normatively and as a matter of positive
law—to be a question for debate and argument rather than an
assumed truth.
We don’t claim credit (or blame!) for these developments.
Nevertheless, we do think we might have played a role. As we
embarked on our scholarly collaboration, we soon found ourselves
part of a small number of corporate law pioneers—sometimes
labeled “progressives” or “communitarians” though not all would
accept either label—who were willing to take positions that were
definitely out of the mainstream, even though we risked
marginalization within the corporate law academy. The conference
we organized at Washington and Lee in 1993—called “New
Directions in Corporate Law”—was designed to energize scholars,
especially junior ones, who were dissatisfied with the mainstream
orthodoxy and were looking for a supportive group of like-minded
academics willing to think seriously about alternatives. Perhaps
our writing encouraged others inclined to challenge mainstream
144. Professor Bainbridge is the most prominent proponent of this view. See
generally Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 76.
145. Professor Bebchuk is the best known partisan for a robust shareholder
empowerment agenda. See generally Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing
Shareholder Power, supra note 84.
146. Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental
Sustainability, supra note 109, at 47–65.
147. See id. at 56 n.85 (identifying several scholars who he labels “highly
regarded dissenters” from the mainstream view that shareholder primacy should
be the law).
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orthodoxy to do so as well. Maybe swimming against the tide is a
little easier if one has companions.
Regardless of how influential we might have been in
stimulating new questions and establishing new priorities, we are
both proud of having been part of a movement that sought to move
beyond shareholder primacy toward new conceptions of corporate
purpose and management responsibility. And we’re happy that our
law school’s name has been attached to that movement.148 But the
important thing for us is that the discourse has changed in ways
that we think are extremely important. While many scholars
continue to embrace a shareholder primacy orientation, there are
now credible, broadly shared alternatives. That is not going to
change any time soon. For us that has been an immensely
gratifying development. And, in optimistic moments, we imagine
that the momentum may even be trending in our direction,
although that question—assuming it can even be answered—
might best be left for another day.
Beyond the academy, it is harder to be confident that there is
significant movement away from shareholder primacy as the
normal conception of corporate purpose and management
responsibility. There have been encouraging developments. There
are plenty of anecdotes about companies realizing that treating
employees well can generate financial pay-offs. And there is a
growing body of empirical research showing that socially
responsible companies can outperform rivals fixated on the
bottom line.149 Even so, there is a broadly held cultural
assumption that the ultimate focus of corporate activity ought
to be shareholder wealth maximization. As noted above,
business leaders generally embrace this idea, which is taught in

148. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A
Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship,
82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 856 (1997) (stating that “the principal resistance” to the
nexus-of-contracts theory of the corporation was “currently offered by a group of
relatively young academics loosely centered around the corporate law faculties at
Washington & Lee and George Washington law schools”); William H. Simon,
What Difference Does It Make Whether Corporate Managers Have Public
Responsibilities?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1697, 1697 (1993) (referring to the
“Washington and Lee School of corporate jurisprudence”).
149. See generally Eccles et al., The Impact of Corporate Sustainability, supra
note 120.
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leading business schools, and the business press seems largely
to take it for granted. 150
Standard descriptions of the management-shareholder
relationship reflect and reinforce shareholder primacy values.
Shareholders are typically referred to as the “owners” of the
corporation. This is a mistake; they own the corporation’s stock
and enjoy the rights that go with that property interest, but
neither they nor anyone else “owns” the corporate entity.
Nevertheless, the ownership idea obviously implies that the
stewards
of
the
shareholders’
property—corporate
management—ought to manage it in the owners’ interest, just
as, for example, the manager of a rental property ought to
operate it primarily with the landlord’s financial interests in
mind. The mistaken agency description of the relationship
between shareholders and management 151 seems also to have
infiltrated public discourse about corporate law. This too implies
a strong normative slant, namely that management should act
on behalf of and in the interests of the shareholders according
to normal legal conceptions of the principal–agent
relationship.152
Not only is shareholder value widely assumed to be the
appropriate benchmark for assessing corporate performance;
shareholder value is today typically thought of in terms of
maximizing current stock market prices through strong
quarterly accounting results. 153 This is the widely noted
“short-termism” phenomenon, which discourages even
profitable long-term investment necessary for the corporation’s
sustainability because of its immediate impact on profits and
share price.154 Widely used equity-based executive compensation
150. Supra notes 121–125 and accompanying text.
151. Supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
152. For discussions of various metaphors for the management-shareholder
relationship and their normative slant, see generally David Millon, The
Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood, 2 STAN. AGORA: ONLINE J.
LEGAL PERSP., Winter 2001, at 39; David Millon, Personifying the Corporate Body,
2 GRAVEN IMAGES: J. CULTURE, L. & SACRED 116 (1995); David Millon, Theories of
the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201 (1990).
153. See Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental
Sustainability, supra note 109, at 53.
154. See Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis and Corporate
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 268 (2012) (“[S]hort terminism . . . is defined as
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arrangements give management a personal stake in maximizing
current share prices, the point being to align managerial
incentives with the shareholders’ interest in share price. 155 And,
as noted above, 156 management is also subject to external
pressures from institutional shareholders who are themselves
facing strong incentives to focus on current share prices.
One might have thought that first the accounting scandals of
2001, involving Enron and other companies,157 and then the
financial crisis of 2008158 would have prompted a broad rethinking
of shareholder primacy. Both situations involved efforts to boost
profits and share prices, by fraud in the first case,159 and by
excessive, reckless risk-taking in the second.160 The social costs
were obvious in both cases.161
the excessive focus of corporate managers, asset managers, investors, and
analysts on short-term results, whether quarterly earnings or short-term
portfolio returns, and a repudiation of concern for long-term value creation and
the fundamental value of firms.”).
155. See Millon, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental
Sustainability, supra note 109, at 57 (“Equity-based compensation—stock grants
and options—are typically the most important component of . . . [CEO]
compensation packages, giving executives a direct stake in share price
movements.”).
156. See supra notes 126–135 and accompanying text (describing the
pressures upon institutional investors to provide returns for their beneficiaries
and how these investors in turn put pressure on corporate managers).
157. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder
Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1276–88 (2002) [hereinafter Bratton, Enron and the
Dark Side of Shareholder Value] (describing the catastrophic bankruptcy and
accounting fraud scandal of the Enron corporation in 2001).
158. See generally The Origins of the Financial Crisis: Crash Course,
ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/
21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article
(last
visited Apr. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Economist] (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
159. See Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, supra note
157, at 1285 (“[T]he line between appropriate and inappropriate behavior has
dissolved for many under real-world pressure to produce shareholder value.
Exploitation and expansion of the gray area has become routine. The resulting
loss of perspective facilitated Enron’s step across the line to fraud.”).
160. See Economist, supra note 158 (“Under pressure from shareholders to
increase returns, banks operated with minimal equity, leaving them vulnerable
if things went wrong.”).
161. See Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, supra note
157, at 1277 (describing the layoffs of 4,000 Enron employees, whose 401(k)
retirement plans were also rendered virtually worthless, because they had been
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Yet there has been no general reevaluation of a shareholder
primacy conception of corporate purpose, such as occurred during
the hostile takeover era. Then, business leaders were effective
advocates for reform. The interests of corporate management
aligned with those of workers and other nonshareholders because
both stood to lose from a wide-open market for corporate control.162
In contrast, the more recent crises saw management as the villain,
either as crooks or as incompetents who did not fully understand
the risks their companies were assuming. Had corporate leaders
criticized shareholder primacy and called for reform, they would
have lacked credibility.
There may be an institutional story as well. The Delaware
judiciary took the lead in adjusting the law governing hostile
takeovers to serve the conflicting interests of managers,
shareholders, and nonshareholders.163 The judges were required to
decide the cases that came before them and therefore had no choice
but to confront the significant public policy questions presented by
the litigants.164 And they could do so without being subject to the
political, interest-driven pressures that legislators face.165
In contrast, in the wake of the 2001 and 2008 crises, judges
generally were not called upon to decide foundational questions of
corporate purpose. Instead it fell to the United States Congress to
address demands for reform. First in Sarbanes–Oxley166 and then
sixty percent invested in the now-worthless Enron stock); Economist, supra note
158 (describing the massive worldwide economic downturn that resulted from the
near crash of financial markets following the collapse of Lehman Brothers).
162. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Takeovers and Corporate
Law: Who’s in Control?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1177, 1206 (1993) (“Management
and nonshareholder interests may be naturally aligned in hostile takeovers. Both
want to resist: managers so that they can keep their jobs and other
nonshareholders so that they can avoid the various sorts of disruptions that
predictably follow from sudden changes in control . . . .”).
163. Supra notes 23 and 31.
164. See Johnson, Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and
Corporate Law, supra note 36, at 887 (“Given the legislative public-law vacuum,
the takeover dilemma falls squarely into the laps of the Delaware
Judiciary. Unlike legislators, judges cannot evade the knotty questions associated
with social transformation . . . [J]udges respond . . deciding specific cases for
litigants while resolving bedrock issues for society at large.”).
165. See id. (“[J]udges respond on an acute rather than a systematic basis,
deciding specific cases for litigants . . . .”).
166. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 107 P.L. 204, 116 Stat. 745.
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in Dodd–Frank,167 we ended up with a grab bag of provisions that
aimed generally at empowering shareholders or that mandated
new regulations purportedly for their benefit—even though it was
obvious in both cases that shareholders’ appetite for profits
motivated the misconduct.168 Here federal legislators seem to have
been captive to a myopic, binary vision of corporate law, which is
incapable of conceiving of corporate law reform other than in proshareholder terms.169 More far-reaching reform is not even
considered.
While the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby170 decision did reject
the view that business corporations are legally required to pursue
profit at the expense of competing values,171 that decision seems
unlikely to prompt broad acceptance of that interpretation of the
law. The Court’s interpretation of state corporate law on the
question of corporate purpose is not binding on state courts
deciding questions of state corporate law.172 Further, the majority
opinion, although correct in its conclusion, is not as clear as one
might have preferred. And the political context—exemption from
167. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 111 P.L.
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). As the name indicates, this statute included a number
of consumer protection measures, including the creation of a new agency, but it
did not use reform of corporate or securities law for that purpose.
168. See Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, supra note
157, at 1283 (“That pursuit of immediate shareholder value caused them to
become risk-prone, engaging in levered speculation, earnings manipulation, and
concealment of critical information.”); Economist, supra note 158 (“Low interest
rates created an incentive for banks, hedge funds and other investors to hunt for
riskier assets that offered higher returns.”).
169. See David Millon, Shareholder Primacy in the Classroom After the
Financial Crisis, 8 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 191, 191 (2013) (“In the wake of the financial
crisis, most corporate law reform efforts have focused on the interests of the
shareholders. . . . [S]uch proposals reflect the widely held assumption that the
primary purpose of corporate activity . . . is to maximize the shareholders’ returns
on their investments.”).
170. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2771 (2014).
171. See id. at 2771 (“[M]odern corporate law does not require for-profit
corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else . . . .”). For
discussion, see generally Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law after Hobby Lobby,
supra note 51.
172. See Johnson & Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, supra note 51,
at 24 (“But the Court’s views on corporate purpose would not be binding in the
context of a state law dispute on the issue of permitted (or mandated) corporate
purpose, if the state’s highest court had decided otherwise or the state legislature
had amended the corporate statute.”).
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Obamacare’s contraception mandate on religious grounds—has
tainted the majority opinion in the eyes of progressive scholars who
might otherwise be willing to embrace its views on corporate
purpose.
So, for now at least, there does not seem to be strong,
coordinated, and effective pressure for rejection of shareholder
primacy outside of the legal academy. The Delaware judiciary and
many business leaders take for granted that shareholder primacy
is the law.173 Social norms and extra-legal pressures also
discourage socially responsible management.174 While we and our
colleagues at other law schools may have succeeded in encouraging
debate and new ways of thinking about foundational questions, we
are left with the disappointing truth that so far we seem to have
had limited impact beyond our academic world.
V. Conclusion
Over the past thirty years, a constant theme runs through
most of my co-authored and solo corporate law writing. That is
concern about the social costs of a shareholder primacy conception
of corporate purpose and managerial responsibility. Early on,
Professor Johnson and I focused on the hostile takeover context
because the conflict between shareholder and nonshareholder
interests was so starkly presented. More recently, I have written
about corporate social responsibility from several angles, focusing
on legal as well as extra-legal impediments to widespread
voluntary adoption of policies designed to address the social costs
of corporate activity.175 Meanwhile, Professor Johnson has
continued to write about corporate purpose, corporate officers, and
the relationship between religion and corporate law.176
173. See Lyman Johnson, Unsettled in Delaware Corporate Law: Business
Judgment Rule, Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 434 (2013)
[hereinafter Johnson, Unsettled in Delaware Corporate Law] (exploring the
origins of erroneous beliefs in shareholder primacy as established law and
attributing the sources of such beliefs to “perceptions . . . about legal mandates,
business norms and conventions,” business schools, and other sources).
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 126, at
911; Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, supra note 37, at 1019.
176. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, Debarring Faithless Corporate and Religious
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It seems undeniable that the scholarly landscape has changed
dramatically since we started our collaborative work. There is now
serious and robust debate about whether shareholder primacy is
the law and also whether it should be. We think this is a very
positive development. Without claiming too much credit, we both
think we played an important role in helping to bring about a
major change in the focus of the scholarly conversation. I am less
sanguine about developments beyond legal academy. Although the
accounting scandals of 2001 and the financial crisis of 2008 should
have prompted widespread debate about the social costs of chasing
corporate profits, that does not seem to have occurred. Law reform
efforts seem instead to have focused on protection for shareholders,
as though corporate law exists in a binary world of management
and investors, and law reform can only consist of efforts to tilt the
balance of power in the direction of shareholders. The prospects for
movement beyond that myopic worldview seem dim, even more so
in the current political environment.

Fiduciaries in Bankruptcy, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 523, 524 (2011); Lyman
Johnson, Re-Enchanting the Corporation, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 83, 89
(2010); Johnson, Unsettled in Delaware Corporate Law, supra note 173, at 413–
15, 432–33.

